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UNNECESSARY ROUGHNESS: 
RECONCILING HART AND KELLER WITH A FAIR USE 
STANDARD BEFITTING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
MICHAEL “BUBBA” SCHOENEBERGER 
Two lawsuits have created a stir in the sports law community 
threatening to derail the NCAA’s monopoly on licensing the images of both 
present and former student-athletes.  In both Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
and Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., former collegiate quarterbacks attack the 
NCAA, the CLC, and Electronic Arts for the unauthorized use of their 
likeness in the popular video game franchise NCAA Football.  Recent 
scholarship has focused on the viability of the NCAA and how these cases 
may tear down any semblance of amateurism left in college sports. 
This Note, however, focuses on how these two cases have the potential 
to inform the relationship between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity.  Courts have struggled to devise a test that accurately represents 
this relationship, which has spawned myriad tests.  What makes Keller and 
Hart the perfect test cases is that the cases deal with the exact same issue, 
yet come to the opposite conclusion.  This Note traces the history and 
policy justifications of the right of publicity to derive a fair use standard 
befitting the right of publicity.  The new fair use factors are then applied to 
Keller and Hart’s factual scenarios to show why the outcomes differ and 
what appellate courts should do in the future. 
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UNNECESSARY ROUGHNESS: 
RECONCILING HART AND KELLER WITH A FAIR USE 
STANDARD BEFITTING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
MICHAEL “BUBBA” SCHOENEBERGER∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A rewarding aspect of playing quarterback for Arizona State was the 
joy Sam Keller felt whenever he played NCAA Football, the popular video 
game from Electronic Arts (“EA”).1  Although his name did not appear in 
the game, there was little doubt that Keller inspired the virtual quarterback 
leading the Sun Devils’ offense in the 2005 edition.2  Keller and his virtual 
counterpart were nearly identical, sharing the same jersey number, height, 
weight, skin color, hair color, and hometown.3  Like many other gamers, 
Keller found the realism of NCAA Football appealing and vital to his 
overall gaming experience.4  Since his days on the gridiron, however, 
Keller has come to view the video game as an exploitation of his right of 
publicity.5 
In 2009, three lawsuits threatened to derail the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation.6  Keller filed a class-action suit against EA and the NCAA 
alleging a violation of his right of publicity.7  Ed O’Bannon, former UCLA 
basketball star, filed suit against the NCAA, the Collegiate Licensing 
Company (“CLC”), and EA alleging a conspiracy to require student-
athletes to forgo their publicity rights in perpetuity in violation of the 
Sherman Act.8  On the east coast, former Rutgers quarterback Ryan Hart 
                                                                                                                          
∗ State University of New York at Cortland, B.A. & B.S. 2011; University of Connecticut School 
of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Lewis Kurlantzick for providing 
thoughtful feedback throughout the drafting of this Note.  I dedicate this Note to the loving memory of 
my dad, Michael V. Schoeneberger, who was and always will be my number one fan. 
1 Katie Thomas, College Stars See Themselves in Video Games, and Pause to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 4, 2009, at A1.  
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Gina Reif Ilardi, First Amendment v. the Right of Publicity: The Game Is On!, METROPOLITAN 
CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2012, at 17. 
7 Id. 
8 Money & March Madness: The NCAA Lawsuit, PBS FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-and-march-madness/ncaa-lawsuit/ (last updated Oct. 
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filed a putative class action suit against EA alleging the misappropriation 
of student-athletes’ likenesses in connection with several editions of NCAA 
Football.9 
Scholarly reaction has fixated on the possible downfall of the NCAA.10  
A legal victory by any of these former athletes would threaten the status 
quo, potentially forcing the NCAA to share its estimated four billion dollar 
market for licensed merchandise with former—and possibly current—
student-athletes.11  One scholar claimed that “[i]f Keller is compensated 
even a modest amount, the damage to the NCAA (and EA) could 
foreseeably be enormous,” giving every athlete ever depicted in NCAA 
Football or NCAA March Madness strong precedent for future lawsuits.12  
Moreover, the NCAA would be required to pay treble damages under 
federal antitrust law.13 
Sports columnist Dan Wetzel described one of the plaintiffs as a “sort-
of Curt Flood of college sports,”14 referencing the potential to revolutionize 
the relationship between the NCAA and collegiate athletes.15  It is quite 
possible that Sam Keller and Ryan Hart will become the proverbial Curt 
Floods of this generation; however, when all is said and done, their 
legacies may more closely resemble that of Hugo Zacchini, the “human 
cannonball.”16  Zacchini’s landmark case legitimized the right of publicity 
and attempted to define the relationship between such a right and the First 
                                                                                                                          
4, 2011).  The O’Bannon and Keller lawsuits have been consolidated in the Northern District of 
California under the name In Re: NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation.  Id.  
However, the court granted Keller a stay to appeal the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit, which 
will be the focus of this Note.  Ilardi, supra note 6. 
9 Michael McCann, Ryan Hart’s Federal Lawsuit Against Electronic Arts Dismissed, SPORTS L. 
BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2011/09/ryan-harts-federal-lawsuit-
against.html. 
10 See, e.g., Christian Dennie, Changing the Game: The Litigation that May Be the Catalyst for 
Change in Intercollegiate Athletics, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 49–50 (2012) (predicting the creation of 
a new “modified amateurs” class distinct from student-athletes that will allow certain players to receive 
compensation while under the purview of the NCAA). 
11 Dan Wetzel, Making NCAA Pay?, YAHOO! SPORTS RIVALS (July 21, 2009), 
http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/basketball/news?slug=dw-ncaasuit072109. 
12 Bill Cross, Comment, The NCAA as Publicity Enemy Number One, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1221, 
1244 (2010). 
13 Andrew B. Carrabis, Strange Bedfellows: How the NCAA and EA Sports May Have Violated 
Antitrust and Right of Publicity Laws to Make a Profit at the Exploitation of Intercollegiate 
Amateurism, 15 BARRY L. REV. 17, 39 (2010).  
14 Wetzel, supra note 11.   
15 Curt Flood, a former baseball player, courageously challenged the legality of the reserve clause, 
which provided that upon the expiration of a player’s contract, the rights to that player were retained by 
his previous team.  The Supreme Court refused to strike down the reserve clause, but Marvin Miller 
used this case to leverage bargaining power against Major League Baseball in negotiating what we now 
call (unrestricted) free agency.  Nick Acocella, Sportscentury Biography: Flood of Free Agency, ESPN 
CLASSIC, http://espn.go.com/classic/biography/s/flood_curt.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). 
16 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977). 
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Amendment.17  Today, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.18 is 
still the only right of publicity case ever considered by the Supreme 
Court.19  However, the right of publicity is ripe for review, especially 
considering the litany of different tests that each circuit has employed to 
resolve the right of publicity—First Amendment tension.20 
Ironically, the publicity that Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.21 and Keller 
v. Electronic Arts, Inc.22 have received from scholars may help force the 
Supreme Court’s hand.  These two cases provide the perfect storm for 
tackling the right of publicity; we have two district courts considering the 
identical issue within the same video game, and yet, the opinions could not 
differ more.  Keller and Hart’s inconsistency is just a microcosm of the 
current state of this jurisprudence, which is begging for the highest court’s 
review.23 
This Note proposes a test akin to copyright fair use and the 
transformative use test applied in both Keller and Hart.  These decisions 
will illustrate the deficiencies of the current framework and provide an 
example of the efficacy of this Note’s proposed test by reconciling the two 
opinions.  Part II will briefly discuss the background of the right of 
publicity chronicling its evolution from an element of the right of privacy 
into a distinct property right.  Part III will examine the policy justifications 
underlying both the right of publicity and the First Amendment.  Part IV 
will outline the various tests courts have used to balance the right of 
publicity against the First Amendment.  Part V will focus on the Keller and 
Hart decisions, emphasizing the transformative use analysis.  Finally, Part 
VI will introduce a new test incorporating the copyright fair use doctrine 
with new elements designed to advance right of publicity considerations. 
II.  MORNING WALK-THROUGH: 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
A.  The All-Encompassing Right of Privacy 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote one of the most 
influential law review articles in history, The Right to Privacy.24  The 
gradual expansion of the right to life justified creation of a “right to enjoy 
                                                                                                                          
17 Id. at 565. 
18 Id. at 562. 
19 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D.N.J. 2011). 
20 See infra Part IV.  
21 Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 757. 
22 No. C 09–1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
23 Katie Thomas, Image Rights vs. Free Speech in Video Game Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, 
at A1 (“I think it’s an area that is crying out for Supreme Court review in the right case.” (quoting 
David L. Hudson, Jr.)). 
24 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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life,—the right to be let alone.”25  The initial purpose of this right was to 
prevent the press from “overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds 
of propriety and of decency.”26  The article had a great impact on American 
jurisprudence and did “nothing less than add a chapter to our law.”27  
In the wake of the article, courts struggled to accept a new common 
law right of privacy and in determining its scope and limitations.28  In 
1902, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the adoption of a common 
law right to privacy;29 however, the New York legislature responded 
swiftly, creating a statute establishing both criminal and civil liability for 
the unauthorized use of a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for 
“advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade.”30  Three years later, 
the Georgia Supreme Court held that the misappropriation of an artist’s 
photograph in an advertisement violated his common law right to 
privacy.31  Subsequent opinions32 incorporated the exclusive right to one’s 
identity within the right of privacy.33 
The aforementioned cases fit comfortably within a “right to be let 
alone” since these plaintiffs were exposed to widespread, unwanted 
publicity with the potential to cause distress and embarrassment.34  
However, when celebrities, athletes, and entertainers claimed emotional 
injury for the unauthorized use of their image by advertisers or 
merchandisers—creating additional publicity—it raised some eyebrows.35  
                                                                                                                          
25 Id. at 93; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“[The founders] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions 
and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). 
26 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196. 
27 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946) (quoting Letter from 
Roscoe Pound to William Chilton (1916)). 
28 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:15 (2d ed. 2012). 
29 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556 (1902), superseded by statute, N.Y. 
Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51 (Consol. 2001 & Supp. 2005). 
30 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (Consol. 2001 & Supp. 2005). 
31 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80–81 (Ga. 1905). 
32 See, e.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 63–64 (N.C. 1938) (holding that 
individuals had a right “not only against the scandalous portraiture and display of one’s features and 
person, but against the display and use thereof for another’s commercial purposes or gain”); Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909) (finding a right against “the publication of the 
picture of a person without his consent”); see also Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public 
Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 168 (1993) (citing Kunz v. Allen, 
172 P. 532, 533 (Kan. 1918) (holding that a right to privacy is “derived from natural law”)). 
33 Madow, supra note 32, at 168. 
34 Id. 
35 See id. at 168–69 (“After all, how could a movie star or professional athlete, who had 
deliberately and energetically sought the limelight, complain of embarrassment or hurt feelings when 
an advertiser or merchandiser simply gave his face some additional publicity?  How could someone 
like Babe Ruth, who had performed before thousands, posed for photographs, granted interviews, made 
paid public appearances, and endorsed products, complain of distress or humiliation when his picture 
was used without his consent on a baseball card or in a cereal advertisement?” (footnote omitted)). 
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This type of action did not fit well within the right to privacy since it did 
not allege an emotional harm, but rather an economic harm causing 
diminished income.36 
Understandably, courts were unsympathetic to these celebrity plaintiffs 
in the 1920s and 1930s.  Many courts held that celebrities “waived their 
rights of privacy . . . by assuming positions of prominence and visibility.”37  
In O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,38 the Fifth Circuit held that Davey O’Brien, 
an All-American college football player, had relinquished his privacy right 
by consenting to national media exposure of his on-field prowess and 
“repeatedly pos[ing] for photographs for use in publicizing himself and 
[his] team.”39  O’Brien alleged that a beer company used his photograph on 
a football calendar without his consent.40  Judge Hutcheson had little 
sympathy for the star athlete, noting that “the publicity he got was only that 
which he had been constantly seeking and receiving.”41 
B.  Propertizing the Right of Publicity 
Widespread reluctance to enforce the commercial misappropriation tort 
under the right to privacy umbrella led some lower courts to recognize a 
distinct property right in the value of one’s image and likeness.42  
However, the Fifth Circuit rejected this notion in Hanna Manufacturing 
Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.43  In this case, Hillerich contracted with 
professional baseball players for the “exclusive right” to use their names, 
autographs, and photographs in connection with the sale and advertising of 
baseball bats.44  Hanna, a competing bat manufacturer, had no agreements 
with these players, but nevertheless manufactured bats with similar styles 
and name imprints.45  Hillerich sued to enjoin Hanna from selling the bats, 
alleging an exclusive property right to use those names on baseball bats.46  
                                                                                                                          
36 James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 
TEX. L. REV. 637, 641 (1973). 
37 Madow, supra note 32, at 169. 
38 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942). 
39 Id. at 169. 
40 Id. at 168–69. 
41 Id. at 170. 
42 See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Mo. 1911) (“If there is value in [one’s 
appearance], sufficient to excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the property of him who gives it 
the value and from whom the value springs?”); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394 
(N.J. Ch. 1907) (“If a man’s name be his own property, as no less an authority than the United States 
Supreme Court says, it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one’s features is not also one’s 
property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner rather than to the 
person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.” (citation omitted)). 
43 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935). 
44 Id. at 764. 
45 Id. 
46 Hillerich sued on two grounds, the second alleging that Hanna’s use of the names falsely 
implied an endorsement and thereby constituted unfair competition.  Id. at 768.  The Fifth Circuit did 
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The Fifth Circuit held that Hillerich’s contracts with the players merely 
prevented the players from objecting to the use of their names, and that 
trademark and unfair competition law governed Hillerich’s rights against 
third parties.47  The court reasoned that characterizing the players’ right to 
prevent unauthorized use of their names as a “personal” or “property” right 
was inconsequential since it was “not vendible in gross so as to pass from 
purchaser to purchaser unconnected with any trade or business.”48  More 
importantly, the court added, “Fame is not merchandise.  It would help 
neither sportsmanship nor business to uphold the sale of a famous name to 
the highest bidder as property.”49 
Eighteen years later, a court finally recognized the economic value of 
fame “in addition to and independent of” a right of privacy.50  In the 
landmark case Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,51 
the Second Circuit held that baseball players have “a right in the publicity 
value of [their] photograph.”52  Judge Jerome Frank famously wrote: 
This right might be called a “right of publicity.”  For it is 
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially 
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings 
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would 
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for 
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, 
displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and 
subways.  This right of publicity would usually yield them no 
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive 
grant which barred any other advertiser from using their 
pictures.53 
The opinion “essentially propertized the right by averring that it could be 
licensed or assigned and enforced against third parties by the licensee or 
assignee.”54  
Haelan generated a number of different reactions.  William Prosser, in 
                                                                                                                          
not overturn the district court’s ruling in favor of Hillerich on this claim and ultimately granted an 
injunction that would allow Hanna to continue to print the players’ names on the bats under certain 
conditions.  Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 766. 
49 Id. 
50 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 
346 U.S. 816 (1953). 
51 Id. at 866. 
52 Id. at 868. 
53 Id. 
54 Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: Will One Test Ever 
Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 952 (2006) (citing Haelan Laboratories, Inc., 202 
F.2d at 868). 
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his immensely influential law review article, Privacy, viewed the phrase 
“right of publicity” narrowly, merely signifying a licensee’s exclusive right 
to use one’s name and likeness.55  On the other hand, Joseph Grodin—who 
later became a justice of the California Supreme Court—recognized the 
broader implications of the decision: “[T]he Haelan case gave protection to 
persons’ commercial interest in their personality independent of their 
privacy interest. . . . If courts wish to protect both interests to at least some 
extent, they should do so under separate doctrines, so that limitations 
appropriate to each interest may be imposed.”56 
This confusion all but vanished when Melville Nimmer exposed the 
failure of traditional areas of law to protect the commercial interest in a 
person’s identity.57  While the “concept of privacy which Brandeis and 
Warren evolved fulfilled the demands of Beacon Street in 1890,” Nimmer 
questioned its application to “the needs of Broadway and Hollywood in 
1954.”58  Their concern was the preservation of privacy against a press 
“overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of 
decency.”59  “With the tremendous strides in communications, advertising, 
and entertainment techniques, [celebrity] likeness [took] on a pecuniary 
value undreamed of at the turn of the century.”60  These cultural and 
technological forces necessitated the creation of a right of publicity, an 
agenda born by Haelan and subsequently endorsed by Nimmer.61 
Courts were initially reluctant to embrace this new right,62 but 
ultimately the right of publicity gradually gained widespread judicial and 
                                                                                                                          
55 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 1:26; William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406 
(1960).  Prosser’s article divided the tort of invasion of privacy into four separate and distinct 
categories, the last of which being “appropriation privacy.”  Prosser, supra, at 389.  However, he did 
not accept the phrasing “right of publicity” because he viewed the tort as protecting both a commercial 
and personal dignity interest.  Id. at 415.  His failure to distinguish between “appropriation privacy” 
(injury to dignity and feelings) and commercial misappropriation of one’s identity has led to some 
confusion despite many courts referring to this fourth tort as the “right of publicity.”  See Carson v. 
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Henceforth, we will refer to 
Prosser’s last, or fourth category, as the ‘right of publicity.’”); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 
F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[Prosser’s fourth category] has in recent years acquired the label ‘right 
of publicity.’”). 
56 Joseph Grodin, Note, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1127, 
1130 (1953). 
57 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954) 
(surveying the “inadequacy of privacy” as a foundation of a commercial market for “publicity values” 
because the law defined privacy as a personal, non-assignable right); id. at 210–12 (analyzing the 
inadequacy of unfair competition because “[p]ublicity values of a person or firm may be profitably 
appropriated and exploited without the necessity of any imputation that such person or firm is 
connected with the exploitation undertaken by the appropriator”).  
58 Id. at 203. 
59 Id. (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196). 
60 Id. at 204. 
61 Id. at 222–23. 
62 Madow, supra note 32, at 176. 
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scholarly acceptance.63  It would, however, take another quarter century 
before the Supreme Court reviewed this newly established right of 
publicity. 
III.  FILM SESSION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
UNDERLYING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
To formulate a workable test that balances the right of publicity and 
the First Amendment, it is appropriate to examine the theoretical 
underpinnings of both legal concepts.  Scholars and courts have identified 
five primary policy justifications for the right of publicity: (1) allowing the 
famous to enjoy the fruits of their own labor; (2) preventing unjust 
enrichment; (3) providing incentives for creativity; (4) efficient allocation 
of property rights; and (5) personal autonomy.64 
A.  Right of Publicity 
1.  Lockean Labor Theory 
John Locke’s theory asserts that the property right inherent in one’s 
self justifies the “right to exclude others from possessing his body and 
controlling the output of his labor.”65  Furthermore, “[w]hen a person 
‘mixe[s]’ his labor with a thing in its natural (that is unowned) state, he 
‘join[s] to it something that is his own’ and ‘thereby makes it his 
property.’”66 
Arguably the most important contribution by Nimmer was grounding 
the right of publicity in the labor theory: 
It is . . . unquestionably true that in most instances a person 
achieves publicity values of substantial pecuniary worth only 
after he has expended considerable time, effort, skill, and 
even money.  It would seem to be a first principle of Anglo-
                                                                                                                          
63 See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir. 1969) (recognizing that a 
professional baseball star could grant an exclusive right to use an imprint of his name to a baseball 
manufacturer); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Minn. 1970) (holding that major 
league baseball players had a proprietary interest in their names, sporting activities and 
accomplishments sufficient to enjoin unauthorized use for commercial purposes). 
64 See Jennifer L. Carpenter, Internet Publication: The Case for an Expanded Right of Publicity 
for Non-Celebrities, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, at *11 (2001) (identifying four of the proffered 
justifications); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 
383, 411, 417 (1999) (advocating the adoption of the personal autonomy justification for the right of 
publicity). 
65 Michael Decker, Note, Goodbye, Norma Jean: Marilyn Monroe and the Right of Publicity’s 
Transformation at Death, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 257 (2009) (citing Madow, supra note 
32, at 175 n.239). 
66 Madow, supra note 32, at 175 n.239 (alterations in original) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17, 19 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690)). 
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American jurisprudence, an axiom of the most fundamental 
nature, that every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors 
unless there are important countervailing public policy 
considerations. . . . [P]ersons who have long and laboriously 
nurtured the fruit of publicity values may be deprived of 
them, unless judicial recognition is given to what is here 
referred to as the right of publicity. . . .67 
The Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Zacchini, finding that “the 
[publicity] interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright 
law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors.”68 
Legal scholar Michael Madow rejects this theory contending that 
numerous variables contribute to the creation of fame.69  He asserts that “a 
celebrity’s public image is always the product of a complex social, if not 
fully democratic, process in which the ‘labor’ (time, money, effort) of the 
celebrity herself . . . is but one ingredient, and not always the main one.”70  
In fact, it is the public, rather than the star, that is responsible for the 
creation and molding of the celebrity’s image.71  Fame, therefore, is a 
“‘relational’ phenomenon” conferred by the audience and media who 
consequently deserve to share in the benefits of the celebrity’s image.72 
2.  Unjust Enrichment 
The Supreme Court articulated another moral rationale: the prevention 
of “unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.”73  Professor Harry Kalven 
stated that “[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant get for 
free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for 
which he would normally pay.”74  Thus, some have characterized free-
riding violators of publicity rights as thieves or hitchhikers.75 
                                                                                                                          
67 Nimmer, supra note 57, at 216. 
68 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977); see also Uhlaender v. 
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (“A celebrity must be considered to have 
invested his years of practice and competition in a public personality which eventually may reach 
marketable status.  That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and other personal 
characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property.” (emphasis added)). 
69 Madow, supra note 32, at 183–96. 
70 Id. at 195. 
71 Franke, supra note 54, at 954. 
72 Id.; Madow, supra note 32, at 188. 
73 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. 
74 Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law–Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966). 
75 Decker, supra note 65, at 260 n.130; see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (describing the defendant’s conduct as being that of “the average thief”); Onassis v. 
Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (“The commercial hitchhiker 
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The problem with this theory, like the labor theory, is that the 
celebrities are often “reap[ing] what they have not sown” by building upon 
the creations of others before them.76  Madow argues that “[c]ultural 
production is always . . . a matter of reworking, recombining, and 
redeploying already-existing symbolic forms, sounds, narratives, and 
images.”77  Locke would counter by arguing that a laborer may justly claim 
rights in the value that the transformation added—through the mixing of 
his or her labor—to the original property.78  However, it would seem unjust 
to allow a celebrity to monopolize the value of this creation since it only 
entitles the laborer to the proportionate value transforming the original.79  
It follows, then, that it is illogical to prevent use of the celebrity’s image by 
parties other than the celebrity (e.g., the media and the public) who play a 
role in the creation of his or her public image when the “unauthorized 
commercial appropriators oftentimes add something of their own—some 
humor, artistry, or wit—to whatever they ‘take,’ and their products may 
service markets different from those that the celebrity herself . . . chooses 
to service.”80 
3.  Incentivizing Creation 
The incentive justification, espoused in Zacchini, states that 
“protection [of publicity rights] provides an economic incentive for [the 
performer] to make an investment required to produce a performance of 
interest to the public.”81  Conversely, without protecting the value in one’s 
identity, there would be no incentive to “expend the time, effort, and 
resources necessary to develop talents and produce works that ultimately 
benefit society as a whole.”82  In reference to the corresponding policy in 
copyright, Chief Justice Bird wrote: 
[P]roviding legal protection for the economic value in one’s 
identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates 
a powerful incentive for expending time and resources to 
develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public 
recognition . . . . While the immediate beneficiaries are those 
who establish professions or identities which are 
commercially valuable, the products of their enterprise are 
                                                                                                                          
seeking to travel on the fame of another will have to learn to pay the fare or stand on his own two 
feet.”). 
76 Franke, supra note 54, at 955. 
77 Madow, supra note 32, at 196. 
78 Decker, supra note 65, at 258 (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 
26 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690)). 
79 Id. 
80 Madow, supra note 32, at 204. 
81 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
82 Madow, supra note 32, at 206. 
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often beneficial to society generally.  Their performances, 
inventions, and endeavors enrich our society.83 
Critics of this rationale simply examine how and why one becomes 
famous, which reveals the futility of incentives.  One of the more obvious 
criticisms is that fame existed long before the creation of this right, which 
suggests that incentives do not encourage the development of valuable 
personas.  Madow observed that people could achieve fame in ways 
divorced from any investment on behalf of the celebrity including “through 
sheer luck, through involvement in public scandal, or through criminal or 
grossly immoral conduct.”84  Some athletes and entertainers seek fame for 
non-economic purposes like, for example, earning the respect and 
admiration of the public.85  Even so, the vast majority of these famous 
persons are “very handsomely compensated,” while the right of publicity 
merely generates a “collateral source of income.”86  Even a prominent 
athlete like Lebron James who makes more than double his player salary in 
endorsements each year would consider this income ancillary.87  Thus, 
absent a right of publicity, there would be incentives to become famous 
separate from collecting royalties from licensing one’s identity. 
4.  Allocative Efficiency 
This theory—a modern tragedy of the commons—dictates that “in a 
free market economy, granting individuals exclusive rights to property is 
an effective way of allocating scarce resources.”88  Specifically, conferring 
a property right to the celebrity will prevent the devaluation of the 
commercial value in his or her identity by preventing overexploitation by 
the general public.89  Richard Posner argued that publicity rights assure 
that advertisers who place the highest value on this exclusive license will 
                                                                                                                          
83 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
84 Madow, supra note 32, at 179; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 
cmt. c (1995) (“In [some] cases the commercial value acquired by a person’s identity is largely 
fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment made by the individual . . . .”). 
85 See Franke, supra note 54, at 956 n.80 (“These [non-economic] incentives include the desire 
for fame itself, the satisfaction of realizing and exercising one’s talents, the pleasure of winning 
people’s applause, inspiring their love and awe, earning their respect and gratitude, and the social and 
status rewards that are unique to the modern celebrity.” (citing Madow, supra note 32, at 214)). 
86 Madow, supra note 32, at 209. 
87 Cf. Decker, supra note 65, at 263 (using the example of Tiger Woods to illustrate this point 
(citing Madow, supra note 32, at 210)). 
88 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 2:7 (citing Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property 
and the Legacy of International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 414 (1983)). 
89 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978). 
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purchase that right at market price.90  Without legal recognition of a right 
of publicity, no market or market price exists; rather, the person’s identity 
becomes communal property within the public domain.91  The Fifth Circuit 
adopted this logic: 
[I]f a well-known public figure’s picture could be used freely 
to endorse commercial products, the value of his likeness 
would disappear.  Creating artificial scarcity preserves the 
value to him, to advertisers who contract for the use of his 
likeness, and in the end, to consumers, who receive 
information from the knowledge that he is being paid to 
endorse the product.92 
This theory rests on the presumption that the value of a celebrity’s 
name or likeness diminishes through overuse.93  This may be the case in 
advertising after a prolonged period of overuse; however, the opposite may 
also prove true where consumers value a product (e.g., a Madonna T-shirt) 
simply because “everybody’s got one.”94  This phenomenon, the cultural 
network effect, suggests that “a consumer’s utility associated with a good 
increases as others also purchase it.”95 
Even assuming overuse negatively affects publicity rights, the celebrity 
bears those costs, not society at large.96  Unlike the tragedy of the 
commons, this does not involve a non-renewable natural resource; the field 
of potential celebrities remains abundant despite others losing the 
commercial value in their identity.97  “After all, there would be no 
‘tragedy’ in the classic parable if the herdsmen, after depleting their 
common pasture, could simply move on to another one.”98 
5.  Personal Autonomy 
Legal scholar Alice Haemmerli advocated for the restructuring of the 
right of publicity under a new philosophy: Immanuel Kant’s theory on 
                                                                                                                          
90 See id. (“There is a perfectly good economic reason for assigning the property right in a 
photograph used for advertising purposes to the photographed individual: this assignment assures that 
the advertiser to whom the photograph is most valuable will purchase it.”). 
91 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 2:7. 
92 Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1994). 
93 See Decker, supra note 65, at 264 (“The allocative efficiency argument rests on the idea that 
celebrity can be depleted by overuse, but, in fact, fame tends to feed on itself.” (citing Madow, supra 
note 32, at 188)).  
94 Madow, supra note 32, at 221–22. 
95 Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1177, 1212 (2000). 
96 Madow, supra note 32, at 224. 
97 Decker, supra note 65, at 264. 
98 Madow, supra note 32, at 224. 
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personal autonomy.99  Freedom is the ‘“one sole and original right that 
belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity,’ and it comprises 
‘the attribute of a human being’s being his own master.’”100  This notion of 
“control and self-determination” implies an individual’s right to control the 
use of his or her own persona, since interference causes an infringement of 
the innate right of freedom.101 
In Kant’s view, “property is inseparably associated with one’s 
‘personhood’ because property grows out of freedom and freedom is 
essential to personhood.”102  Property is an extension of freedom; therefore, 
the person should have the exclusive right to use his image and control the 
objectification of that image as his own property.103  Haemmerli saw 
Kant’s philosophy as a means to reconcile the moral and economic 
characteristics of the right of publicity rather than “mak[ing] a 
dichotomous choice between a privacy right concerned with moral  
injury . . . or a purely pecuniary publicity right.”104 
This theory seems to “enhance[] the autonomy and personality 
interests of one person only by harming the interests of another.”105  An 
expansive right of publicity will inevitably chill speech, particularly 
expression involving the most popular celebrities since they are “the 
easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, 
likeness, or voice.”106  The Kantian approach erroneously implies that a 
celebrity is morally entitled to deny the public the ability to express 
themselves by protecting his own reciprocal interest.107  Furthermore, the 
personal autonomy justification fails to contemplate the transition from the 
tort-based right of privacy to the economic right of publicity.108  Legal 
scholars Dogan and Lemley argued that courts and scholars abandoned the 
human dignity rationale in favor of labor-based moral rights to allocate 
revenue to the celebrity for his or her commercial exploitation.109 
                                                                                                                          
99 Haemmerli, supra note 64, at 414. 
100 Id. (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 44 (John Ladd 
trans. & ed., Library of Liberal Arts 1965) (1797)).  
101 Id. at 416. 
102 Id. at 418. 
103 Id. at 418–21. 
104 Id. at 422. 
105 Steven Semeraro, Property’s End: Why Competition Policy Should Limit the Right of 
Publicity, 43 CONN. L. REV. 753, 780 (2011); see also White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 
1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“In the name of avoiding the ‘evisceration’ of a 
celebrity’s rights in her image, the majority diminishes the rights of copyright holders and the public at 
large.  In the name of fostering creativity, the majority suppresses it.”). 
106 White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 508 U.S. 
951 (1993). 
107 Semeraro, supra note 105, at 780. 
108 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark 
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1180–81 (2006). 
109 Semeraro, supra note 105, at 781; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 108, at 1182. 
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B.  The First Amendment 
The First Amendment safeguards freedom of speech and expression in 
our society.  Two frequently cited justifications for the First Amendment 
are: (1) The fostering of a “free marketplace of ideas” essential to a 
democratic society; and (2) “fulfill[ing] the human need for self-
expression”110 
To achieve these goals, the Supreme Court has extended the 
constitutional protections of the First Amendment to entertainment.111   
Justice Reed explained, “The line between the informing and the 
entertaining is too elusive . . . . What is one man’s amusement, teaches 
another’s doctrine.”112  With this quote, entertainment entered the 
proverbial free marketplace of ideas as another form of expression.  The 
Court has also explicitly endorsed protecting various forms of self-
expression, stating, “[t]he actor on stage or screen, the artist whose creation 
is in oil or clay or marble, the poet whose reading public may be 
practically nonexistent, the musician and his musical scores . . . are [all] 
beneficiaries of freedom of expression.”113 
The right of publicity will inevitably conflict with both of these First 
Amendment purposes in certain circumstances.  Madow soundly points out 
that individuals and groups use celebrity images in their everyday lives to 
produce “meanings of their own making.”114  Thus, it is essential that the 
public be able to use the celebrity’s persona freely and creatively without 
the risk of censorship, or more importantly, self-censorship.115  Their 
images are “widely used—far more than are institutionally anchored 
elites—to symbolize individual aspirations, group identities, and cultural 
values.”116  Giving celebrities absolute control over their identities would 
facilitate private censorship of popular culture, inhibiting both creative 
processes and freedom of expression. 
The sphere of protected expression shrinks significantly in the context 
of commercial speech, or “speech that does ‘no more than propose a 
                                                                                                                          
110 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and 
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 66 (1994) [hereinafter “Kwall I”].  A third justification—
guarding against violent societal eruptions by providing meaningful vehicles of expression—is not 
particularly relevant to the right of publicity.  Id. 
111 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
112 Id. 
113 Kwall I, supra note 110, at 67 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1961) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting)). 
114 Madow, supra note 32, at 143. 
115 Id. at 146. 
116 Franke, supra note 54, at 959 (quoting Madow, supra note 32, at 128). 
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commercial transaction.’”117  For example, the Third Circuit held that the 
use of a thirteen-second audio of narrator John Facenda in a half-hour 
“Making of Madden NFL ‘06” video was commercial speech because its 
sole purpose was to promote EA’s Madden NFL ‘06 video game.118  While 
the First Amendment affords a degree of protection to commercial speech, 
it is significantly less than that enjoyed by political and entertaining 
speech.119  Thus, the right of publicity will, in most instances, trump an 
advertiser’s right to use a celebrity’s image.  
However, the line between expressive and commercial speech is far 
from clear.120  This confusion arises because the First Amendment “is not 
limited to those who publish without charge and an expressive activity 
does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is undertaken 
for a profit.”121  Thus, expressive speech that contains commercial 
elements presents a problem that has plagued the variety of balancing 
techniques employed to resolve the struggle between the right of publicity 
and the First Amendment. 
These doctrinal justifications provide the groundwork for balancing the 
right of publicity against the First Amendment.  Understanding these 
justifications can help create a proper mechanism to resolve the tension 
between these doctrines—a task that lower courts have struggled with due 
to the lack of guidance from one particular Supreme Court case. 
IV.  PRE-GAME WARM-UP:  
ESTABLISHED FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING TESTS 
A.  Zacchini & “The Entire Act” Standard 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the only Supreme 
Court case addressing the right of publicity,122 involved a local television 
station that recorded a human cannonball’s entire act without his 
                                                                                                                          
117 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 n.24 
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 
(1973)). 
118 Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1015–18 (3d Cir. 2008). 
119 Kwall I, supra note 110, at 68.  False or misleading commercial speech is afforded no 
protection.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563–
64 (1980); see also id. at 561–62 (“Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the 
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible 
dissemination of information.”). 
120 See Franke, supra note 54, at 960 (noting that “the fact that a lot of expressive speech contains 
commercial elements” creates a great deal of confusion). 
121 Id. (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1979)); see also 
Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that 
profit motive alone does not make speech “commercial”). 
122 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D.N.J. 2011). 
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permission and broadcast it on the evening news.123  Zacchini claimed a 
misappropriation of his act while the television station claimed First 
Amendment protection for the news broadcast.124  To begin, the Court 
explicitly recognized a right of publicity as a separate cause of action from 
the right of privacy.125  The Court added: 
The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the 
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the 
theft of good will.  No social purpose is served by having the 
defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would 
have market value and for which he would normally pay.126 
Although the Court recognized this right, it was seemingly at odds 
with free speech considerations.  Even so, the Supreme Court held that 
Zacchini’s interest in protecting the economic value of his “entire act” 
outweighed the television station’s First Amendment prerogative to 
disseminate newsworthy information.127  The Court attempted to apply a 
balancing test; however, the decision failed to provide guidance for lower 
courts to apply the test in the future.128  The Court stated, “Wherever the 
line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are 
protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast 
a performer’s entire act without his consent.”129 
Many courts have attempted to limit Zacchini’s application to its facts; 
particularly where a defendant appropriates a performer’s entire act, courts 
find a violation of the right of publicity without engaging in any balancing 
with the First Amendment.130  Thus, while many have overanalyzed 
Zacchini over the years, no test has effectively resolved the conflict 
                                                                                                                          
123 433 U.S. 562, 563–64 (1977). 
124 Id. at 564. 
125 Id. at 573. 
126 Id. at 576 (alteration in original) (quoting Kalven, supra note 74, at 331). 
127 Id. at 575. 
128 Lower courts have analyzed Zacchini as employing a balancing test weighing the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment.  See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court [in Zacchini] has 
directed that state law rights of publicity must be balanced against first amendment considerations.” 
(citing 433 U.S. at 562)). 
129 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75. 
130 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D.N.J. 2011); see, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 956 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Zacchini has been criticized as being very ‘narrowly 
drawn’ in that it involved the wholesale reproduction of a live ‘entire act.’”).  The decision may even 
suggest that Zacchini applies only to performances, rather than the misappropriation of one’s identity.  
See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“[T]his case . . . involv[es], not the appropriation of an entertainer’s 
reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very 
activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.”). 
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between the First Amendment and the right of publicity.131 
Despite the lack of guidance from Zacchini, lower courts and scholars 
have attempted to devise tests to perfect the balance of these two rights.132  
To date, there are at least five different approaches: (1) fair use; (2) the 
transformative use test; (3) the predominant use test; (4) the Restatement 
approach; and (5) general ad hoc balancing. 
B.  The Fair Use Defense 
Several commentators have advocated the adoption of a modified 
version of copyright’s “fair use” test to analyze First Amendment defenses 
in right of publicity cases.133   Defendants in copyright suits often assert a 
“fair use”134 of the copyrighted material, or “a privilege in others than the 
owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable 
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the 
[owner of the copyright.]”135  
The fair use doctrine drew criticism as “the most troublesome in the 
whole law of copyright”136 and “entirely equitable and . . . so flexible as 
virtually to defy definition.”137  Nonetheless, the doctrine has produced 
general agreement about which factors apply and how to weigh such 
factors.138  Although fair use has posed issues in close cases, courts have 
little difficulty applying it in the majority of cases, and “there is sufficient 
consensus about the parameters of fair use to give rise to scholarly 
scoldings when courts on occasion misuse the doctrine.”139 
                                                                                                                          
131 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the 
Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1356–57 (2009) [hereinafter “Kwall II”].  Even Justice 
Powell, in dissent, recognized that the “entire act” standard had little precedential value for application 
to future publicity cases.  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
132 Kwall II, supra note 131, at 1357. 
133 See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 64, at 466 (advocating that application of a fair use test to the 
right of publicity “is a sound idea” despite differences between copyright and publicity rights); Randall 
T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 781, 815–20 (1988) (applying a modified fair use doctrine to right of publicity cases to promote 
the twin policies underlying that right: promoting creativity and preventing unjust enrichment); Pamela 
Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and 
Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 915 (1983) (delineating a modified fair use standard applicable 
to right of publicity cases); Douglas G. Baird, Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1206 (1978) (“Accommodation 
of the competing interests of the press and performers requires a tool of mediation analogous to fair 
use.”). 
134 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
135 Samuelson, supra note 133, at 884 (alteration in original) (citing HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW 
OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).  
136 Id. at 885 (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)). 
137 Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).  
138 Id. 
139 Id.  Cf. Douglas J. Ellis, Comment, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment: A 
Comment on Why Celebrity Parodies Are Fair Game for Fair Use, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 575, 612 (1996) 
 
 1894 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1875 
Samuelson urged the application of a two-tiered fair use test based on a 
broad interpretation of Zacchini’s holding.140  The first step assesses the 
“substantiality of the property interest” and the “degree of impairment . . . 
from the appropriation of the right.”141  In doing so, the factors to consider 
would include: 
1. The purpose and character of the appropriator’s use 
of the publicity right, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit purposes; 
2. The nature of the asserted publicity right; 
3. The amount and substantiality of the appropriation of 
the publicity right by the defendant; and 
4. The effect of the defendant’s appropriation upon the 
potential market for or value of the publicity right.142 
If, upon application of these factors, fair use is not established, the 
presumption is that the First Amendment does not outweigh the 
“impingement on a substantial property right.”143  However, “this 
presumption could be overcome by proof that access to the protected 
matter was necessary to achieve the dissemination of information and 
public debate objectives which underlie the [F]irst [A]mendment.”144  
Haemmerli reformulated this second step to ask whether “access is 
necessary as a matter of artistic expression to permit individuals and 
groups to ‘play with’ meaning and to come up with new ways of recoding 
cultural icons, or whether these needs can be satisfactorily fulfilled in 
alternative ways without invading conflicting property rights.”145  In other 
words, “Is the use necessary to achieve the public information, public 
discourse, or self-realization goals that underlie the First Amendment?”146 
Many disapproved of these proposals to adopt a modified fair use test.  
At the most basic level, the assumption that fair use internally 
accommodates copyright to the First Amendment may be erroneous.147  
                                                                                                                          
(“Despite a certain amount of ambiguity in its factors and the tendency of courts to misapply them, 
copyright’s fair use doctrine provides a relatively stable and succinct method of analysis for parody 
defenses to the right of publicity.”). 
140 Samuelson, supra note 133, at 858, 915–16. 
141 Id. at 915. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 916. 
144 Id. 
145 Haemmerli, supra note 64, at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146 Franke, supra note 54, at 969 (quoting Haemmerli, supra note 64, at 471). 
147 The Supreme Court has suggested that the idea/expression dichotomy actually balances 
copyright and free speech interests.  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (noting that the idea/expression dichotomy “strike[s] a definitional balance 
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Additionally, the test, formulated for copyright law, fails to address an 
important rationale of the right of publicity grounded in trademark law, 
consumer protection.148  No court has adopted this test, and one has even 
rejected a wholesale importation of fair use into the right of publicity.149 
C.  The Transformative Use Test 
Though many disfavored using a blanket copyright fair use test, courts 
have used the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use,” in 
right of publicity cases.150  The transformative use test weighs First 
Amendment protection for expression against a person’s right of publicity 
by determining “whether the [person’s] likeness is one of the ‘raw 
materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the 
depiction or imitation of the [person] is the very sum and substance of the 
work in question.”151 
The Supreme Court of California first articulated the transformative 
use test in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.152  In this 
case, the plaintiff, owner of all rights associated with “The Three Stooges,” 
sought damages and injunctive relief for the reproduction of the comedians 
on charcoal drawings and lithographs.153  In applying the test, the court 
reasoned that: 
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction 
or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly 
trespassing on the right of publicity without adding 
significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law 
interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the 
expressive interests of the imitative artist. . . . [However], 
when a work contains significant transformative elements, it 
is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, 
but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest 
protected by the right of publicity.154 
The court concluded that the Three Stooges’ likenesses was not “one of the 
‘raw materials’ from which [the] original work [was] synthesized,” but 
                                                                                                                          
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while 
still protecting an author’s expression” (quoting 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983))). 
148 Kwall I, supra note 110, at 61. 
149 See, e.g., Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 964, 972 (10th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting the district court’s use of the entire copyright fair use defense in favor of balancing the 
right of publicity against the First Amendment). 
150 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001). 
151 Id. at 809. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 800.  
154 Id. at 808 (footnote omitted).  
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rather “the very sum and substance of the work,” in violation of their rights 
of publicity.155 
The Ninth Circuit observed that decisions applying the transformative 
use test represent a spectrum; on one end, Comedy III represents a blatant 
infringement, and on the other, Winter v. DC Comics156 represents a 
substantial transformation.157  In this case, the comic book “Jonah Hex” 
depicted well-known musicians, Johnny and Edgar Winter, as villainous 
half-worm, half-human offspring that bore their distinctive pale faces and 
long white hair.158  After stating that the application of the test was “not 
difficult,”159 the court concluded that the comic book characters were not 
“conventional depictions,” but contained “significant expressive content” 
beyond mere reproductions of the plaintiffs’ likenesses.160 
Somewhere in the middle of this spectrum falls ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publishing, Inc.161  In this case, Tiger Woods’s licensing agent sued artist 
Rick Rush for creating and selling a painting featuring Woods’s likeness 
celebrating victory at the 1997 Masters Tournament in Augusta, 
Georgia.162  The painting also included a panorama of golf legends, 
including Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus, in the background observing 
Woods’s triumph.163  The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the painting did 
not “capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods” because the artist 
added “a significant creative component of his own to Woods’s 
identity.”164  The emphasis was not on the reproduction of Woods, but 
rather the transformative “message that Woods himself will someday join 
that revered group” of legendary golfers,165 which entitled it to the full 
protection of the First Amendment.166 
Two cases applying the transformative use test to video games were 
particularly informative in the Keller and Hart decisions.167  In Kirby v. 
Sega of America, Inc.,168 the California Court of Appeals held that a video 
                                                                                                                          
155 Id. at 809. 
156 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
157 Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 890 (9th Cir. 2009). 
158 Winter, 69 P.3d at 476. 
159 Id. at 479. 
160 Id.  Cf. Mine O’Mine, Inc. v. Calmese, No. 2:10-CV-00043-KJD-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
75236, at *23 (D. Nev. July 12, 2011) (finding the character “Shaqtus”—a half-human, half-cactus 
cartoon of basketball star Shaquille O’Neal—to be just as sufficiently transformative as the cartoon 
images of the Winter brothers). 
161 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
162 Id. at 918. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 938. 
165 Id. at 936. 
166 Id. at 938. 
167 See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 782 (D.N.J. 2011) (asserting that Kirby and 
No Doubt are instructive in that both applied the transformative use test in the video game context). 
168 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
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game character fashioned after a celebrity singer’s appearance and style 
was sufficiently transformative for full free speech protection.169  Kirby 
was a 1990s singer known for the phrase “ooh la la,” which also resembled 
the name of the alleged character imitation, “Ulala.”170  Also, like Kirby, 
the character wore platform shoes, had similar facial features and hair 
color, and wore attire like that worn by the singer.171  However, Ulala 
differed from Kirby in physique based, in part, on the use of the Japanese-
style animation form of anime.172  The court also noted that the setting for 
the game, a twenty-fifth century space age, and her corresponding 
futuristic occupation as a space-reporter were unique; and altogether, it 
amounted to a sufficient transformation.173 
In the second case, the rock-band No Doubt sued the developer of the 
Band Hero video game for exceeding the bounds of the parties’ licensing 
agreement.174  Band Hero included avatars designed to resemble the band 
members’ likenesses with great detail.175  Ruling in favor of No Doubt, the 
court held that the game was not transformative, reasoning that: 
[The developer] intentionally used . . . literal reproductions, 
so that players could choose to “be” the No Doubt rock stars.  
The game does not permit players to alter the No Doubt 
avatars in any respect; they remain at all times immutable 
images of the real celebrity musicians . . . .176 
The court further noted that these avatars are unlike the character in Kirby 
because the avatars were not “fanciful, creative characters.”177 
The transformative use test has earned a fair amount of critics since its 
inception.178  Eugene Volokh criticized Comedy III’s varying definitions of 
transformation, which borrowed language from copyright law and fair 
                                                                                                                          
169 Id. at 617. 
170 Id. at 609–10. 
171 Id. at 610–11. 
172 Id. at 616. 
173 Id. at 610; see also id. at 618 (“As in Winter, Ulala is a ‘fanciful, creative character’ who exists 
in the context of a unique and expressive video game.  Similar facts distinguished Winter from Comedy 
III, and the same distinction applies here.  [Respondents’] portrayal of Ulala is protected by the First 
Amendment.” (quoting the trial court)). 
174 No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 409–10. 
177 Id. at 410. 
178 See, e.g., Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-
Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 493 (2003) (noting that the transformative use 
test has proven to be problematic); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 903, 914–25 (2003) (engaging in a detailed analysis of the problems with the 
transformative use test); Schuyler M. Moore, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: The First Amendment vs. the 
Right of Publicity for Expressive Works, 25 ENT. L. REP., Nov. 2003, at 8–10 (enumerating several 
arguments that prove the transformative use test unworkable). 
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use.179  Even the Comedy III court called the distinction between protected 
and unprotected expression “subtle,” providing a vague standard with little 
predictive value.180  Another critic, Schuyler Moore, even questioned the 
logic and First Amendment rationale behind justifying protection for 
“transformative” works, but not “non-transformative” works.181  Despite 
these criticisms, both district courts found this test appropriate to apply in 
Keller and Hart. 
D.  The Predominant Use Test 
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,182 the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected 
the transformative use test in favor of a “more balanced balancing test.”183  
The test states: 
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product 
should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be 
protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some 
“expressive” content in it that might qualify as “speech” in 
other circumstances.  If, on the other hand, the predominant 
purpose of the product is to make an expressive comment on 
or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given 
greater weight.184 
A former hockey player, Anthony “Tony” Twist, sued Todd 
McFarlane, the creator of the Spawn comic series, for the improper use of 
his name and likeness.185  McFarlane named a mafia don in his comic 
series “Anthony ‘Tony Twist’ Twistelli,” but the character bore no 
resemblance to the hockey player aside from the name and “reputation as a 
tough-guy enforcer.”186  Despite these dissimilarities, the court held that 
“the use and identity of Twist’s name has become predominantly a ploy to 
sell comic books and related products rather than an artistic or literary 
expression . . . .”187 
The problem with this test is evident; how does one distinguish 
between a predominantly commercial or expressive purpose “when the two 
go hand in hand?”188  Mark Lee, the creator of the predominant use test, 
                                                                                                                          
179 Volokh, supra note 177, at 916–17. 
180 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001). 
181 Moore, supra note 177, at 10. 
182 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
183 Id. at 374. 
184 Id. (citing Lee, supra note 177, at 500). 
185 Id. at 365. 
186 Id. at 365–66. 
187 Id. at 374. 
188 Moore, supra note 177, at 13. 
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suggested that other judicial approaches like the “merchandise v. media” 
distinction,189 the “alternative means” test,190 the Restatement’s 
“unrelatedness” test,191 and the “transformative use” test192 could assist in 
determining whether the predominant purpose is exploitative or 
expressive.193  However, even Lee concedes that these various approaches 
are “individually unsatisfying or incomplete,”194 so it is questionable why 
they should guide the analysis of a more comprehensive approach.195 
Perhaps even more disconcerting is the test’s reliance on commercial 
success.  Lee’s example reveals this defect: “If people buy a picture of 
Tiger Woods predominantly because they like Tiger Woods, rather than 
because they are attracted to the composition of the picture, that picture 
should be deemed to violate Tiger Woods’s right of publicity.”196  The 
Tiger Woods example illustrates that “if [a] product receives commercial 
success because of the individual’s identity, that is the end of the analysis 
and the First Amendment is not available.”197  Such a test would chill 
artistic endeavors and free speech, especially for works that include very 
famous celebrities or athletes that would garner commercial success 
regardless of the amount of expression. 
E.  The Restatement Approach 
The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition provides that “if the 
name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not 
related to the identified person, the user may be subject to liability for a use 
of the other’s identity in advertising.”198  Also known as the “relatedness” 
                                                                                                                          
189 See Lee, supra note 177, at 500 (“For example, the ‘merchandise v. media’ [distinction] can be 
a practical shortcut to quickly resolve the issue in many circumstances.  While one could argue that a 
bumper sticker, swizzle stick, bobblehead doll, or poster includes some expressive content, most often 
they predominately are intended to capitalize on the commercial value of an individual’s  
identity . . . .”). 
190 See id. at 500–01 (“The ‘alternative means’ test can also help a court assess whether publicity 
rights are being exploited by determining whether the taking of intellectual property could have been 
avoided in the first place.  An unnecessary use is more likely to be an exploitive, and hence actionable, 
use of the publicity right.”). 
191 See id. at 501 (“The Restatement’s ‘unrelatedness’ test can also help evaluate whether use of 
an individual’s identity in a work of expression is appropriate by helping to assess whether the use was 
intended to make a genuine comment about or merely to exploit the goodwill of the celebrity.”). 
192 See id. (“[T]he California Supreme Court’s [transformative use] test can help to determine 
whether the use is primarily exploitative or communicative by encouraging judicial focus on the nature 
of the use.”). 
193 Franke, supra note 54, at 975 (citing Lee, supra note 177, at 500–01). 
194 Lee, supra note 177, at 500. 
195 See Franke, supra note 54, at 975–76 (noting the pitfalls of the “merchandise v. media” 
distinction, the “alternative means” test, and the Restatement approach). 
196 Lee, supra note 177, at 500. 
197 Franke, supra note 54, at 976. 
198 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995). 
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test, it essentially “protects the use of another person’s name or identity in 
a work that is ‘related to’ that person.”199  The scope of “related uses” is 
broad, including: 
[T]he use of a person’s name or likeness in news reporting 
 . . . use in entertainment and other creative works, including 
both fiction and nonfiction . . . [use] as part of an article 
published in a fan magazine or in a feature story broadcast on 
an entertainment program . . . dissemination of an 
unauthorized print or broadcast biography . . . [and u]se of 
another’s identity in a novel, play or motion picture . . . .200 
This approach, while attempting to distinguish between expressive and 
commercial speech, fails to consider that many uses of a person’s identity 
are both expressive and commercial.201  Though these tests purport to 
balance the right of publicity and First Amendment, the inquiry ends once 
the use is determined to be expressive.202  For this reason, many courts 
have applied the transformative use or predominant use test as a better 
balancing mechanism. 
F.  Ad Hoc Balancing 
The least structured approach involves a “case-by-case weighing of 
competing values and interests to determine whether ‘speech’ in a 
particular case is deserving of constitutional immunity from legal 
liability.”203  The Tenth Circuit was the first to employ such an analysis in 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association.204  The 
court held that Cardtoons’ rights to produce and sell parody baseball 
trading cards outweighed the baseball players’ rights of publicity.205  Judge 
Tacha balanced these rights by weighing the “importance of Cardtoons’ 
right to free expression and the consequences of limiting that right” against 
“the effect of infringing on MLBPA’s right of publicity.”206 
More recently, the Eighth Circuit applied the ad hoc balancing test in 
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, L.P.207  C.B.C. sought declaratory judgment that it had a right to 
use the names and statistics of major league baseball players in its fantasy 
                                                                                                                          
199 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).  
200 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995). 
201 Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
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sports products.208  Advanced Media, a competing fantasy sports provider, 
filed a counterclaim arguing that this violated the players’ rights of 
publicity, to which it had obtained a license.209  The court held that 
C.B.C.’s First Amendment rights in offering its fantasy baseball products 
superseded the players’ right of publicity.210 
McCarthy pejoratively characterized this as an “I know it when I see 
it” approach.211  Furthermore, “there is no rule to be applied, there is only 
unrestrained and unpredictable judicial balancing of competing values.”212  
This approach has not secured widespread application despite its basic 
balancing of a commercial right to one’s identity against freedom of 
expression. 
The myriad tests fail to give courts a principled and consistent method 
of resolving the frequent interaction of the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment.  The lack of uniformity creates difficulty in counseling 
clients, fails to provide predictable standards, and promotes forum 
shopping.  Most troubling, however, are the inconsistent results 
exemplified by the Keller and Hart opinions. 
V.  THE PUBLICITY BOWL:  
KELLER AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY VERSUS  
HART AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Keller and Hart demonstrate that the balancing of the right of the 
publicity and the First Amendment—even when considering the same 
medium—can produce contrary results.  In both cases, former college 
football players sued the same video game manufacturer alleging nearly 
identical facts.  These cases substantiate the need to create a uniform, 
unambiguous standard to protect the right of publicity while maintaining a 
robust public domain. 
A.  Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
In 2010, Samuel Keller, a former quarterback for both Arizona State 
University and the University of Nebraska, filed a lawsuit against EA, the 
                                                                                                                          
208 Id. at 820. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 824.  The court relied on a number of factors including: (1) the information CBC used 
was already in the public domain; (2) courts have “recognized the public value of information about the 
game of baseball and its players”; and (3) the economic interests of the players was not nearly as strong 
since they already receive a great deal of compensation.  Kwall II, supra note 131, at 1362 n.111 (citing 
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, 505 F.3d at 823–24). 
211 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 8.23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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NCAA, and the CLC in the Northern District of California.213  Sam Keller 
graduated from San Ramon High in 2003 as the ninth-best quarterback 
prospect in the nation.214  After three years at Arizona State, Keller 
transferred to Nebraska where he set the school’s single-season records for 
completion percentage (63.1%) and passing yards per game (269.1).215  
Like many before him,216 Keller had a brief stint in the NFL; he was 
waived less than a month after signing with the Oakland Raiders.217 
EA develops interactive entertainment software including the NCAA 
Football series of video games.218  NCAA Football allows consumers to 
simulate football games between more than 120 NCAA teams.219  Keller 
alleged that, “to make the games realistic, EA designs the virtual football 
players to resemble real-life college football athletes, including himself.”220  
These virtual players share “the same jersey numbers,” the “same home 
state,” the same “physical characteristics” (including height and weight), 
and play the same positions as their real-life counterparts.221  Although EA 
omits the athletes’ names from the game, consumers may simply download 
team rosters and upload them into the game with ease.222 
Keller alleged that EA and the NCAA violated his common law, 
California,223 and Indiana224 rights of publicity.225  He also alleged that the 
NCAA and CLC conspired to facilitate this unauthorized use of his 
likeness during a meeting with EA to negotiate agreements involving the 
                                                                                                                          
213 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09–1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2010). 
214 Player Bio: Sam Keller, HUSKERS.COM, http://www.huskers.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OE
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218 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2010); see also Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting that there are 
over 100 college football teams in NCAA Football). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id.; see also id. (“To enhance the accuracy of the player depictions, [Keller] alleges, EA sends 
questionnaires to team equipment managers of college football teams.”). 
222 Id. 
223 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012). 
224 IND. CODE § 32-36-1-8 (2012). 
225 See Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *1–2 (noting that EA is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in California and that NCAA’s headquarters are located in Indiana). 
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NCAA Football video game.226 
The court first listed the elements of a common law right of publicity 
claim: “(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the 
appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, 
commercially, or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting 
injury.”227  Invoking the transformative use test, the court stated that a 
work is “protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains 
significant transformative elements or that the value of the work does not 
derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame.”228 
Relying heavily upon Comedy III, the court described the main inquiry 
as: 
[W]hether the celebrity likeness is one of the “raw materials” 
from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the 
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question.  We ask, in other words, 
whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so 
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own 
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.  And when we 
use the word “expression,” we mean expression of something 
other than the likeness of the celebrity.229 
As discussed above,230 the court then recognized two California 
Supreme Court cases that “‘bookend the spectrum’ used to measure a 
work’s transformative nature.”231  At one end, Comedy III provides an 
example of a non-transformative work, while Winter offers the opposite 
end finding a sufficient transformation.232  Using these two cases as 
guideposts, the court used Kirby as a middling example of the 
transformative use test applied to a video game.233 
Considering this precedent, the court held that the depiction of Keller 
was not sufficiently transformative to provide First Amendment 
protection.234  The court reasoned that Keller “is represented as what he 
was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State” with the “same jersey 
number, . . . the same height and weight and hail[ing] from the same 
                                                                                                                          
226 Id. 
227 Id. at *3 (quoting Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 889 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  “Although the statutory and common law rights are similar . . . to state a 
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state.”235  Furthermore, unlike in Kirby, “the game’s setting is identical to 
where the public found [Keller] during his collegiate career: on the football 
field.”236 
Most importantly, the court rejected EA’s assertion “that the video 
game, taken as a whole, contains transformative elements.”237  Recognizing 
that precedent did not support this argument, the court added: 
In Winter, the court focused on the depictions of the 
plaintiffs, not the content of the other portions of the comic 
book.  The court in Kirby did the same: it compared Ulala 
with the plaintiff; its analysis did not extend beyond the 
game’s elements unrelated to Ulala.  These cases show that 
this [c]ourt’s focus must be on the depiction of [Keller] in 
“NCAA Football,” not the game’s other elements.238 
As of the writing of this Note, EA’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit is still 
pending.239 
B.  Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
Alleging very similar facts, Ryan Hart, a former Rutgers University 
quarterback, brought a putative class action suit against EA in the District 
of New Jersey.240  Hart alleged unauthorized use of his likeness in NCAA 
Football 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2009, in violation of his common law right 
of publicity.241  With respect to NCAA Football 2006, Hart had identical 
allegations to Keller about the realistic portrayal of the virtual players.242  
However, Hart added that the virtual players had identical accessories, 
including a left wristband and helmet visor, and player ratings that 
reflected actual footage of him during his 2005 college season.243 
EA filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the First 
Amendment bars Hart’s right of publicity claim because the NCAA 
Football video games constitute protected expressive works.244  Hart 
disagreed, contending that the game signified speech made for commercial 
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237 Id. 
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purposes.245 
The court began its First Amendment analysis by confirming that the 
NCAA Football video game was entitled to the same protections afforded 
to other expressive works.246  The next threshold question was whether 
NCAA Football constituted commercial speech under the Third Circuit’s 
three-factor test from Facenda.247  The court concluded that, unlike the 
Madden NFL ‘06 infomercial at issue in Facenda, Hart alleged that the 
expressive content of the game itself violated his right of publicity.248  
The court then acknowledged that the Third Circuit had not adopted a 
particular test for balancing the right of publicity and First Amendment, 
but decided to analyze the case under the transformative use test.249  Judge 
Wolfson engaged in a lengthy discussion of the history and criticisms of 
copyright fair use from which the transformative use test derives.250  
The court credited California state court decisions with developing the 
transformative use doctrine in right of publicity cases.251  Thus, Comedy III 
informed the analysis of competing publicity and free speech interests.252  
However, unlike Keller, the court compared Hart’s case to two particularly 
instructive decisions: Kirby and No Doubt.253  In contrast to the 
transformative Ulala in Kirby, the avatars in No Doubt were unalterable 
replicas of the band members.254  Moreover, unlike the immutable band 
members in No Doubt, a user may alter Hart’s image in NCAA Football in 
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the individual then ‘transform[s] in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings.’”  Id. at 778 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).  Just four years following the publishing of Judge Leval’s article, 
the Supreme Court adopted the test in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.  Id.  
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 779. 
253 Id. at 782. 
254 Id. at 783. 
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many ways by editing his “personal characteristics,”255 “accessories,” 
“physical abilities,” “attributes and certain biographical details.”256  
Despite the ability to alter his likeness, this case provided a “closer call 
than that in Kirby and No Doubt” since placing Hart into an NCAA 
Football game—the setting where the public recognizes him—”strongly 
suggests that the goal of the game is to capitalize upon the fame of those 
players.”257  In rejecting this argument, the court used language from the 
Supreme Court to recognize that “features distinctive to [video games]” 
include the player’s interaction with the virtual world by which it conveys 
ideas and social messages.258  Thus, the court held that under the 
transformative use test, EA was entitled to assert the First Amendment 
defense to Hart’s appropriation claim.259  
Before moving on, Judge Wolfson addressed the California court’s 
conflicting decision.  First, Keller’s substantive analysis declined to 
address the ability to alter the players’ image, which the New Jersey court 
found “significant because it suggests that the goal of the game is not for 
the user to ‘be’ the player.”260  Moreover, this ability to alter “is itself a 
noteworthy, expressive attribute of the game.”261  Second, the court 
disagreed with Keller’s approach of focusing solely on the challenged 
image, rather than the work as a whole.262    
Contrary to Keller’s reasoning, I read Kirby as looking at the 
video game in that case, as a whole.  By focusing on the 
setting in which the Ulala character appeared, Kirby 
considered the entire game.  Similarly, the Winter court 
considered that the purported images of the Winter brother 
musicians were “cartoon characters—half-human and half-
worm—in a larger story, which itself is quite expressive.”  
While the Winter court did focus most of its attention on the 
fanciful worm-like characters, it also considered the larger 
story of which the characters were a part.263 
Judge Wolfson’s principal disagreement with Keller is the scope of the 
                                                                                                                          
255 Id. at 785.  NCAA Football permits the user to alter the virtual player’s “height, weight, 
hairstyle, face shape, body size, muscle size, and complexion.”  Id.  For example, a user may choose 
from eight different hairstyle options including variations on a fade, close crop, afro, and balding.  Id. 
256 Id. at 783.  The court noted that C.B.C.’s holding that the use of player names, statistics, and 
biographical data is entitled to First Amendment protection as information within the public domain 
also applies to the public facts connected with Hart’s image.  Id. at 785 n.28.  
257 Id. at 783. 
258 Id. at 785 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011)). 
259 Id. at 787. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. (citations omitted). 
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transformative use test: whether it considers only the transformation of the 
celebrity depiction, or the transformative nature of the depiction in light of 
its interaction with the overall work.  This Note proposes a fair use 
standard that addresses this issue and improves upon the failures of 
established approaches. 
VI.  MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKING:  A NEW FAIR USE STANDARD 
The relationship between the right of publicity and copyright connotes 
that the fair use defense can provide a strong model to incorporate First 
Amendment limitations in right of publicity actions.  Fair use is a judicially 
constructed “rule of reason” establishing a privilege to use copyrighted 
material in a reasonable manner without the owner’s consent.264  One 
commentator has stated that: 
The fair use doctrine thus recognizes that the development of 
the arts and sciences may best be achieved by allowing for 
the free dissemination of certain information affecting areas 
of universal concern, such as history and biography.  By 
providing a limited privilege . . . fair use . . . preserve[s] a 
marketplace of ideas.265 
With Section 107 of the Copyright Act providing a model, a fair use 
defense can be fashioned for application in right of publicity cases.  
However, prior to modifying the factors, we must consider the differences 
between the two intellectual property regimes to avoid a wholesale 
importation of fair use that erroneously accommodates inapposite 
copyright policies. 
A.  Comparing Copyright and the Right of Publicity 
In 1976 Congress enacted the Copyright Act,266 granting exclusive 
rights to original works of authorship.267  While copyright grants an 
exclusive right in creative works, the right of publicity grants an exclusive 
right over one’s personae.268  These monopolies run counter to the goals of 
the First Amendment by chilling free expression; therefore, the need for 
mechanisms to balance these private and public rights is necessary for both 
regimes.  This mechanism is and should be fair use, which “serves as an 
                                                                                                                          
264 Coyne, supra note 133, at 815. 
265 Stephen S. Morrill, Note, Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises: Emasculating the 
Fair Use Accommodation of Competing Copyright and First Amendment Interests, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 
587, 611 (1984). 
266 Copyright Act, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
267 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
268 Coyne, supra note 133, at 814. 
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accommodation of competing [exclusive rights] and [F]irst [A]mendment 
interests so as to preserve a marketplace of ideas.”269  
The Supreme Court recognized that a state’s interest in protecting a 
right of publicity “is closely analogous to the goals of . . . copyright 
law.”270  Both copyright and the right of publicity “provide incentive[s] for 
creative endeavor” that benefit the public at large.271  Copyright seeks the 
advancement of the public welfare through the encouragement of 
individual effort for monetary gain.272  This copyright policy corresponds 
with the state’s interest in providing incentives to create valuable personas 
and, consequently, encouraging the development of those skills or 
achievements that foster public recognition.  Similarly, these doctrines 
function to ensure that the individual will be able “to reap the reward of his 
endeavors.”273  The celebrity benefits from establishing commercially 
valuable identities while the public benefits from the products of their 
enterprise.274  These regimes are so alike that public policy requires 
preemption of certain publicity rights when free enterprise and free 
expression in non-copyrightable material trump those state interests.275 
However, important differences require altering the fair use defense to 
bolster right of publicity policies.  At the most rudimentary level, the right 
of publicity concerns a person, usually a celebrity, while copyright protects 
works fixed in a tangible medium of expression.  The right of publicity 
protects ideas (e.g., a voice); conversely, the Supreme Court considered the 
idea/expression dichotomy an implicit balancing mechanism for copyright 
to accommodate the First Amendment.276  Likewise, some question 
whether the First Amendment should tolerate state interests that undermine 
free expression; copyright is deserving of such a balance since the 
                                                                                                                          
269 Morrill, supra note 265, at 611. 
270 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
271 Coyne, supra note 133, at 812; see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 678 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The reason that state law protects individual 
pecuniary interests is to provide an incentive to performers to invest the time and resources required to 
develop such performances.”); Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right 
of publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort 
invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment 
required to produce a performance of interest to the public.  This same consideration underlies the 
patent and copyright laws long enforced by this Court.”). 
272 Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 679. 
273 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
274 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, J., dissenting). 
275 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 841 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); see also Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
Copyright Act preempted a singer’s claim that a sound recording she licensed to the defendant violated 
her right of publicity through unauthorized use of her voice). 
276 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
 2013] UNNECESSARY ROUGHNESS 1909 
Founders grounded it within the Constitution.277 
Certain policies differ as well.  At least one court has advanced the 
view that a violation of the right of publicity strikes at one’s personhood 
more than an infringement of a copyrighted work.278  The fair use 
doctrine—and copyright in general—does not look to prevent consumer 
deception by ensuring that consumers receive accurate information about 
sponsorship and endorsement.279  Furthermore, legal scholar Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall has argued that unjust enrichment is a principal rationale 
for the right of publicity, while the same interest in copyright has waned in 
recent years.280 
B.  Altering the Factors 
With these key differences in mind, we must adjust the original section 
107 factors to promote the policies of the right of publicity.  The proposed 
factors for publicity rights include: 
1. the nature of the speech, including the extent to 
which the use is transformative; 
2. the nature of the asserted publicity right; 
3. the scope of the misappropriation in relation to the 
purpose of the use; 
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the publicity right.281 
1.  The Nature of the Speech 
This factor will not require an analysis of whether the use is 
commercial in nature, since a prima facie case requires proof of 
commerciality.  Initially, a court should consider whether the use falls 
within a preferred category of expression or within the sphere of 
commercial speech.  The categories enumerated in § 107 have direct 
application to the right of publicity, including “criticism, comment, news 
                                                                                                                          
277 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 177, at 913 (questioning whether the First Amendment can 
endure states barring citizens from being able to express themselves in particular fashions). 
278 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (ruling that the right of 
publicity is not preempted because this right is more personal than those protected by copyright). 
279 Kwall I, supra note 110, at 61.  But see Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 791 
(D.N.J. 2011) (“I question the wisdom of applying a trademark-based test to right of publicity claims 
without accounting for [the] difference[s].”). 
280 Kwall I, supra note 110, at 61–62; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 352–56 (1991) (discrediting the “sweat of the brow” theory of copyright protection that underlies 
the unjust enrichment justification). 
281 See Coyne, supra note 133, at 817 (listing similar factors for a fair use test in the right of 
publicity context). 
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reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, [and] research.”282  Additionally, the 
California Supreme Court has recognized that the right of publicity does 
not provide a shield from creativity in the form of “caricature, parody283 
and satire.”284  In contrast, the commercial speech doctrine prescribes that 
wholly commercial uses should receive diminished protection.285  
Moreover, this factor would provide no protection to falsified celebrity 
endorsement in accord with the First Amendment.286 
For example, if someone wrote an unauthorized biography of Derek 
Jeter, would this be a violation of the shortstop’s right of publicity?  
Assuming that all the facts within the biography are true,287 or at least 
mostly true,288 the right of publicity would yield to “the free dissemination 
of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public interest.”289  
In this scenario, the unauthorized biography falls within the “newsworthy” 
category of protected activity, and would usually result in a finding of fair 
use.  By incorporating First Amendment principles directly into the first 
factor, this fair use standard protects preferred speech categories while 
providing diminished protection for commercial speech.  These categories, 
though not dispositive, will instruct the fair use ruling absent strong 
countervailing policies present in the other factors.  
However, unsurprisingly, most cases do not fall within these preferred 
or non-preferred categories.  In between fall those misappropriations that 
challenge the court to sift through both expressive and commercial 
elements.  Here, courts will apply the transformative use test derived from 
Comedy III.290  However, the test will be different in one respect; no longer 
will transformation be a question of sufficiency, but rather of degree.  
Since transformative use will no longer be dispositive, it provides an 
opportunity to place this inquiry on a sliding scale.  The new test will ask 
the degree to which the “celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ 
from which an original work is synthesized, or . . . the very sum and 
                                                                                                                          
282 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
283 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968–76 (1996) 
(using parody in the context of the right of publicity as a factor to balance the First Amendment). 
284 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001).  It should be 
noted that copyright law disfavors satire in the fair use analysis since it uses an original work to 
criticize something else.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994). 
285 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 
(1976). 
286 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980). 
287 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 8:65. 
288 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (creating some breathing room for First 
Amendment freedoms so that a few mistakes of factual accuracy do not become actionable). 
289 Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff’d, 
301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1969). 
290 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). 
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substance of the work in question.”291 
Though a subtle change, placing transformation on a spectrum makes a 
rigid standard much more flexible.  Comedy III and Winter still bookend 
the spectrum from a purely commercial, non-transformative use to a 
substantial transformation.292  ETW provides the middling example and 
shows the benefits of this flexible factor.  The literal depiction of Tiger 
Woods denotes little to no transformation within the lithograph; however, 
the panorama of golf legends adds a slight transformation in the form of an 
objectively discernible message.293  In such a scenario, neither party should 
benefit from this factor; therefore, the court must consider the other factors 
to make a ruling. 
The new construction of this factor incorporates the predominant use 
test and the Restatement approach, but capitalizes on their flaws by 
creating a sliding scale that removes the sufficiency determination.  
Furthermore, it refines the transformative use inquiry to allow for judicial 
discretion and consideration of other factors. 
2.  The Nature of the Publicity Right 
This factor acts as a limiting principle on those instances of fame that 
do not comport with the twin policies of unjust enrichment and incentive 
creation.  In other words, when the celebrity’s “persona is entirely of his 
own creation, his publicity rights deserve more protection.”294  Admittedly, 
this factor has little to do with its copyright counterpart, which considers 
distinctions like fiction v. non-fiction295 and published v. unpublished296 
works.  Instead, it incorporates both right of publicity and First 
Amendment policies by limiting the scope of a celebrity’s right in favor of 
the public domain that is responsible for his or her fame. 
In fashioning his own fair use standard, Randall Coyne developed a 
similar explanation for this factor.  He proposed, “to the extent that 
plaintiff’s acquisition of fame is unrelated to his creative or intellectual 
efforts, his assertion of publicity rights is undermined.”297  This provides a 
cogent response to Madow’s qualms with the incentive creation and unjust 
enrichment justifications.  First, affording more protection to those 
celebrities who create their own valuable personas through their own labor 
incentivizes such behavior.298  Second, it is unjust for a celebrity to obtain 
                                                                                                                          
291 Id. 
292 See supra Part IV.C and accompanying notes. 
293 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936–38 (6th Cir. 2003). 
294 Coyne, supra note 133, at 819. 
295 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985). 
296 Fair Use Amendment of 1992, Pub. L. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (2006)). 
297 Coyne, supra note 133, at 819. 
298 Madow, supra note 32, at 179. 
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an exclusive monopoly over a right that the public is largely responsible 
for creating.299  This factor will allow the public to enjoy the benefits of 
creating a valuable persona by enlarging the public domain and First 
Amendment protections. 
The question is how do we differentiate between these two publicity 
rights?  How do we classify those personas created by both the celebrity’s 
labor and the public at large?  The first classification, active publicity, will 
comprise the personas of celebrities who have expended “time, effort, 
skills, and . . . money”300 to acquire such fame.  In contrast, passive 
publicity encompasses those commercial identities created solely by the 
public and media.  For example, those who attain notoriety “through sheer 
luck . . . public scandal, or . . . grossly immoral conduct”301 should not 
receive the same publicity rights that athletes and entertainers enjoy.  A 
combination of both creates—as Justice Antonin Scalia would say—a 
tertium quid,302 which, for purposes of this factor, will have the effect of 
passive publicity in favor of a larger public domain.303 
In hindsight, this factor should have played a defining role in an 
important Ninth Circuit case.  In Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, celebrity Paris 
Hilton sued Hallmark Cards for selling a birthday card reading “Paris’s 
First Day as a Waitress.”304  Inside the card was Paris’s face superimposed 
on a cartoon waitress body saying her catch phrase “That’s hot.”305  The 
Ninth Circuit held that Hallmark’s “transformative” defense was 
insufficient to grant the Anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss because the card 
depicted Paris in her natural setting as “born to privilege, working as a 
waitress.”306   
In such a close case, looking at the nature of the publicity right may 
have provided a more fitting decision.  At the outset, the court described 
Paris as a “controversial celebrity known for her lifestyle as a flamboyant 
heiress [or in other words] ‘famous for being famous.’”307  The court even 
acknowledged that Hallmark attempted to parody Paris’s reality television 
                                                                                                                          
299 Id. at 196. 
300 Nimmer, supra note 57, at 215–16. 
301 Madow, supra note 32, at 179. 
302 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “tertium quid” as a “third thing that has qualities distinct 
from the prior two components.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (describing a tertium quid as a combination 
of product packaging and product design under the trade dress doctrine). 
303 Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 215 (“To the extent there are close cases, we believe that 
courts should err on the side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby 
requiring secondary meaning.”). 
304 599 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2010). 
305 Id. 
306 Id. at 911.  It should be noted that the court refused to label the card as a “parody,” which may 
have been sufficient to deem it transformative solely on that basis.  Id. at 910 n.13. 
307 Id. at 899. 
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show “The Simple Life,” where in one episode she worked as a waitress at 
a fast food restaurant.308  Paris Hilton fits comfortably within the definition 
of passive publicity; her fame is a product of a complex social process 
involving both the public and the media molding and constructing her 
image.  According to the Ninth Circuit, while Paris exploits this fame 
through reality television shows, a self-titled pop album, and various 
commercial products, the public domain—which is responsible for her 
success—must yield to her publicity right.  Although a birthday card may 
qualify as commercial speech, the apparent parody and ample expression 
combined with a passive publicity classification should have resulted in a 
dismissal of the case. 
3.  The Extent of the Misappropriation 
This factor has obvious application within the right of publicity 
context.  Simply put, the court evaluates the extent of the misappropriation.  
In reference to the transformative test, the Supreme Court of California 
stated, “[t]he inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking 
whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate in 
the work.”309   
This statement is significant for two reasons.  First, unlike copyright, 
the application of this factor to the right of publicity will stress quantity 
rather than the quality of the expression.  Second, and more importantly, 
the use of the word “work,” as opposed to identity or persona, suggests that 
the inquiry should consider the entire work as a whole.  Later, the court 
reiterated this point by asking whether the “product containing [the] 
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”310  
The California Supreme Court reiterated this rule in Winter, stating 
that the comic book characters were “in a larger story, which is itself quite 
expressive.”311  In Kirby, the court did not consider the depiction of the 
celebrity in isolation.  Rather, it found that Ulala was a “‘fanciful, creative 
character’ who exist[ed] in the context of a unique and expressive video 
game.”312  In ETW, the Sixth Circuit considered the literal depiction of 
Tiger Woods within the context of the entire painting, including the 
background of golf legends, which formed the transformative message.313  
Thus, the inquiry goes beyond merely looking at the depiction of the 
                                                                                                                          
308 Id.  
309 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (emphasis added). 
310 Id. (emphasis added).  Keller misstates this test by solely emphasizing the transformation of 
the celebrity depiction itself.  Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09–1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
311 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003). 
312 Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
313 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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celebrity. 
The underlying medium containing the celebrity depiction will dictate 
the extent of the misappropriation.  For example, in Comedy III, the 
lithograph comprised a literal depiction of the Three Stooges; therefore, the 
court need not consider anything beyond the portrayal of the performers.314  
On the other hand, in ETW, the court had to consider Tiger Woods’s 
depiction and its interaction with the golf legends in the background.315  
The Supreme Court agreed with this conception of misappropriation 
stating that “[v]ideo games . . . [l]ike the protected books, plays, and 
movies . . . communicate ideas . . . through familiar literary devices and 
through features distinctive to the medium.”316  Thus, the First Amendment 
protects not only the transformation of the celebrity depiction, but also the 
transformative nature of the depiction’s interaction with its underlying 
medium. 
Kirby and No Doubt determined the appropriation in this manner as 
well.  In Kirby, the California court considered not only the depiction of 
Kirby as “Ulala,” but also the twenty-fifth century space age setting in 
which the character existed.317   The court took a holistic approach in 
evaluating the character’s manifestation within a transformative setting that 
gave rise to sufficient expression to afford First Amendment protection.  
Conversely, the depiction of the rock band No Doubt within Band Hero 
was not sufficiently transformative.318  However, it is important to note that 
the court considered whether the band’s image was “immutable” and that 
the avatars could not be altered.319  While the court failed to consider the 
setting in which these avatars interacted and placed undue emphasis on the 
celebrity depiction, it did consider a feature—user alteration—distinctive 
to video games in general.  Kirby and No Doubt set the stage for Keller and 
Hart, which is why this factor will play an important role in remedying the 
contradictory opinions. 
4.  The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market 
This factor is nearly identical to its copyright counterpart, asking 
whether the misappropriation affects the celebrity’s use on the present or 
potential licensing market.  The Supreme Court, in reference to copyright, 
described this factor by stating that “a use that has no demonstrable effect 
upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need 
not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to create.”320  
                                                                                                                          
314 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808. 
315 ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 936–38. 
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This reference to incentive creation and the effect upon the potential 
market has direct application to the right of publicity.  
The Restatement defines the contours of this factor.321  Courts should 
analyze the market effect “in light of the informational or creative content 
of the defendant’s use.”322  In the case of an imitation, the public interest in 
fostering competition and creating an expansive public domain will often 
outweigh the adverse effects on the celebrity’s market.323  However, literal 
reproductions create a greater likelihood of harm to an individual’s right of 
publicity.  
The scope of commercial injury is vast.  At the most basic level, the 
right of publicity protects against the unauthorized exploitation of the 
goodwill and reputation linked to one’s name or likeness to his or her 
commercial detriment.324  The protection extends to appropriations of a 
work product linked with the plaintiff’s identity.  An example of this 
would be Zacchini’s “human cannonball” performance.  The commercial 
harm would not only include the loss of a licensing opportunity, but also 
the amount the infringer benefitted from using the name or likeness.  For 
example, Zacchini should have recovered for the lost profits in his “human 
cannonball” performance and lost licensing opportunities to the video of 
his performance.  However, he should also recover the value that he 
brought to the news broadcast, or the value of the number of viewers that 
he attracted to the Scripps-Howard broadcast as opposed to its regular 
viewing audience.   
Finally, the right of publicity even protects against the dilution of the 
commercial value of one’s identity through excessive or harmful uses.325  
Zacchini’s “entire act” standard fits nicely within this factor protecting 
against severe infringements that affect a person’s ability to earn a 
livelihood.  The broadcasting of his entire “human cannonball” act 
“pose[d] a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.”326  
The Sixth Circuit applied the Restatement’s conception of this factor as 
well.  In ETW, the court reasoned that “[Tiger] Woods . . . engages in an 
activity, professional golf, that in itself generates a significant amount of 
income which is unrelated to his right of publicity.  [Absent this right], he 
would still be able to reap substantial financial rewards from authorized 
appearances and endorsements.”327  The court held that the use of Woods’s 
likeness in the prints did not reduce the commercial value of his 
                                                                                                                          
321 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. d (1995). 
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324 Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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likeness.328 
C.  Application to Hart and Keller 
This new fair use test provides the mechanism for reconciling the 
conflicting decisions of Keller and Hart.  Regarding the first factor, it is 
evident that the quarterbacks’ likenesses do not fall within the preferred or 
commercial speech categories.  Therefore, we must consider the degree of 
transformation in light of the “features distinctive to the medium.”329  This 
will include the ability to alter characteristics, play in different modes 
including the “Road to Glory,” and the interaction of the player with the 
virtual stadium and fans.  As Judge Wolfson contended, “it is logically 
inconsistent to consider the setting in which the character sits, which Keller 
does in its analysis, yet ignore the remainder of the game.”330  Despite 
being near literal depictions of the quarterbacks, NCAA Football’s total 
transformation within the distinctive features of a video game weighs this 
factor slightly in favor of Electronic Arts. 
Most collegiate athletes fall within the active publicity classification.  
Through their hard work and effort, these athletes attain a degree of fame, 
albeit some more than others, to exploit during their collegiate careers.  
Athletes will usually benefit from this factor because of how easily their 
publicity rights comport with the Lockean labor justification. 
The third factor presents a great amount of overlap with the first.  We 
cannot simply consider the depiction of Keller and Hart, but rather we 
must evaluate the extent of the appropriation with respect to the entire 
work.  The scope of the inquiry is precisely what caused the contradictory 
decisions.  The Northern District of California merely considered the 
depiction of Keller, while the District of New Jersey looked at the 
depiction of Hart within NCAA Football as a whole.  The Hart decision 
was correct in ruling that the misappropriation was negligible in light of 
the “creative elements [that] predominate in the work.”331 
Finally, the fourth factor will weigh against a finding of infringement.  
Disregarding whether the former student-athletes or the NCAA own the 
right to license their likenesses,332 the imitation of Keller and Hart in 
NCAA Football has little to no demonstrable effect on the potential 
licensing market.  Unlike Zacchini, the student-athletes are not in danger of 
losing their ability to earn a livelihood.  Therefore, the interests of the 
public domain trump their publicity rights. 
                                                                                                                          
328 Id. 
329 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
330 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 787 (D.N.J. 2011). 
331 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (emphasis added). 
332 Drew Lipsky, Should NCAA Athletes Be Paid After Leaving School: Analyzing O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, YAHOO! (Dec. 30, 2011), http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=ycn-10770405. 
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This new fair use test clearly delineates the necessary considerations to 
incorporate the First Amendment into the right of publicity.  After applying 
this test to Keller and Hart, it is clear where the California court went 
wrong, and that Judge Wolfson was correct in ruling in favor of Electronic 
Arts.  
There are three primary benefits in adopting this Note’s proposed fair 
use standard.  First, and most obvious, is the creation of uniformity among 
the lower courts.  As previously discussed, no test has garnered as much 
widespread recognition as the foremost test to balance the right of publicity 
and the First Amendment.  Implementing this Note’s proposed fair use 
standard could provide outcomes that are more predictable and prevent 
forum shopping. 
Second, the proposed fair use standard attempts to remedy the flaws of 
the established balancing tests.  For example, the first factor changes the 
transformative inquiry from a black and white, yes or no inquiry into one 
with much more flexibility.  The traditional transformative use test 
required a dispositive decision that caused inconsistencies like the Keller 
and Hart opinions. 
Third, and most importantly, this standard will combat the gradual 
expansion of the right of publicity beyond that which Prosser or Nimmer 
could imagine.  Under the proposed fair use standard, the First Amendment 
right of the video game publisher trumps the collegiate athletes’ right of 
publicity.  As the right of publicity grows to protect even the evocation of a 
celebrity’s likeness,333 an expansive fair use standard is necessary to 
maintain a rich public domain.  As Judge Kozinski stated, “Overprotecting 
intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. . . . [and, in fact,] 
stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed to nurture.”334 
The remaining ambit of the right of publicity will protect against 
unauthorized advertisements and endorsements.  In other words, 
commercial speech will encompass most of the infringements of publicity 
rights.  Of course, this fair use standard still provides breathing room for 
some infringements beyond commercial speech and some fair uses that 
constitute commercial speech. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Balancing the First Amendment against the right of publicity has 
proved frustrating ever since Zacchini.  This Note’s proposed test provides 
the uniformity that scholars and courts have sought for over thirty-five 
                                                                                                                          
333 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that Samsung’s advertisement using a robot resembling Vanna White on a Wheel of Fortune 
game show set was a violation of her right of publicity). 
334 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
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years.335  The conflicting Keller and Hart opinions represent the state of 
the entire area of law—muddled in a variety of tests with no predictive 
value.  The lack of a clear standard is chilling the First Amendment 
guarantee of free expression and deterring creative endeavors.  This district 
split—and potential circuit split—provides an opportunity for the Supreme 
Court, or Congress, to clarify this chaotic area of law with a fair use 
standard that specially pertains to the right of publicity.  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
335 See, e.g., Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is 
Necessary, 28 COMM. LAW. 14, 19 (2011) (proposing a federal right of publicity statute that 
incorporates a fair use doctrine because “(1) there is no uniformity of laws, and (2) that lack of 
uniformity is a serious threat to the First Amendment”). 
